Demographic differences among consumer groups have become increasingly important to the development of marketing strategies. Marketers depend heavily on the sales force to implement strategies at the consumer level and, not surprisingly, different groups may view the salesperson’s role differently. Unfortunately, unethical sales practices targeted at various consumer groups, and especially at seniors, have been utilized as well. The purpose of this study is to provide initial empirical evidence of the ethical ideological make-up of four age segments outlined by Strauss (...) and Howe (1991, Generations: The History of America’s Future 1584–2069, Morrow, New York) and to examine the propensity for these groups (seniors, in particular) to respond differentially to potentially unethical sales tactics. Data were collected from 179 respondents representing the four generational age groups. MANOVA revealed that the seniors in this study were distinct with respect to ethical ideology and less accepting of unethical sales tactics. Managerial implications are discussed for sales organizations to maximize their effectiveness across consumer groups. (shrink)

A compilation of all previously published writings on philosophy and the foundations of mathematics from the greatest of the generation of Cambridge scholars that included G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Maynard Keynes.

ABSTRACTEmployees who possess cross-cultural capabilities are increasingly sought after due to unparalleled numbers of cross-cultural interactions. Previous research has primarily focused on the bright side of these capabilities, including important individual and work outcomes. In contrast, the purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the cross-cultural capability of cultural intelligence can lead to both positive and negative outcomes. Applying the general theory of confluence, we propose that expatriates high in CQ excel in customer relationship performance, while simultaneously behaving opportunistically. (...) We also suggest that ethical relativism moderates these relationships. Using mixed methods, four separate studies generally support our predictions while also deepening our understanding of various forms of opportunism and the mechanism behind two seemingly opposing effects. Conceptual and managerial implications of CQ for opportunism, customer relationship performance, and ethics are discussed. (shrink)

Husserl envisages transcendental phenomenology as a radically founding science that lays bare the higher-order experiences whereby logic and a theory of science become constituted. On the other hand, according to a usual presentation of Hegel’s philosophy, phenomenology is “logic’s precondition,” and science presents itself as its “result.” This alleged precedence of Hegel’s phenomenology (with its experiential and historical horizons) regarding logic may be a motif behind the current affinities recently traced between Hegelian and Husserlian notions of phenomenology that highlight their (...) views on experience, history, and the lifeworld. This paper offers instead a reconsideration of aspects of their philosophies mostly challenged or dismissed since the rise of positivism: a reappraisal of their views on the relationship between phenomenology, logic, and philosophy as an “absolute” system of sciences. The argument is made that the irreconcilable difference between their projects ultimately stands on the radical contrast between Hegel’s speculative-conceptual method and system of sciences and Husserl’s foundational science and method as experiential-phenomenological all the way through. Despite this methodological abyss, this paper vindicates their affinities in their refusal to segregate science from life, and their attempts to overcome modernity’s inherited fragmentation of culture by providing an all-unifying approach to philosophy. (shrink)

The philosophy of cognitive science has recently become one of the most exciting and fastest growing domains of philosophical inquiry and analysis. Until the early 1980s, nearly all of the models developed treated cognitive processes -- like problem solving, language comprehension, memory, and higher visual processing -- as rule-governed symbol manipulation. However, this situation has changed dramatically over the last half dozen years. In that period there has been an enormous shift of attention toward connectionist models of cognition that are (...) inspired by the network-like architecture of the brain. Because of their unique architecture and style of processing, connectionist systems are generally regarded as radically different from the more traditional symbol manipulation models. This collection was designed to provide philosophers who have been working in the area of cognitive science with a forum for expressing their views on these recent developments. Because the symbol-manipulating paradigm has been so important to the work of contemporary philosophers, many have watched the emergence of connectionism with considerable interest. The contributors take very different stands toward connectionism, but all agree that the potential exists for a radical shift in the way many philosophers think of various aspects of cognition. Exploring this potential and other philosophical dimensions of connectionist research is the aim of this volume. (shrink)

Along with the increasing popularity of connectionist language models has come a number of provocative suggestions about the challenge these models present to Chomsky's arguments for nativism. The aim of this paper is to assess these claims. We begin by reconstructing Chomsky's argument from the poverty of the stimulus and arguing that it is best understood as three related arguments, with increasingly strong conclusions. Next, we provide a brief introduction to connectionism and give a quick survey of recent efforts to (...) develop networks that model various aspects of human linguistic behavior. Finally, we explore the implications of this research for Chomsky's arguments. Our claim is that the relation between connectionism and Chomsky's views on innate knowledge is more complicated than many have assumed, and that even if these models enjoy considerable success the threat they pose for linguistic nativism is small. (shrink)

In the context of the fairly recent Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC), I examine phenomenologically the nature of truth as the essential condition for overcoming social and political conflicts, and as an instrument for enforcing so-called “transitional justice” periods and promoting reconciliation. I also briefly approach the limits of this truth’s possibility of being recognized, if its evaluative and practical dimensions and its appeal to an “intelligence of emotions” do not prevail over its merely theoretical claims. Though not expounding Schutz’s (...) and Husserl’s contributions, and meditating on phenomena they did not deal with, I carry out this reflection inspired by their work and methodological approach. The case study used as an intuitive illustration is the recent Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. (shrink)

First Published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Este trabajo intenta iluminar desde un punto de vista fenomenológico las crisis ecológicas que han afectado a nuestro planeta y al mundo circundante de la vida en el siglo veintiuno, y en particular, la devastadora pandemia global que se desató el año 2020. Primero abordo ciertos aspectos histórico-críticos que preceden a la pandemia del 2020, y que se relacionan a la visión mecanicista moderna en las ciencias y la cultura. Luego, situada en la actitud natural, parto de esta ecocrisis actual (...) como un “hilo conductor” para la interrogación retrospectiva que conduce a las raíces experienciales de todo sentido y validez objetiva, asumiendo la perspectiva de la primera persona y contratastándola con aspectos de una nueva y unificada visión sistémica de la vida. A continuación, destacando la paradoja del sujeto-en-el-mundo y el sujeto-para-el-mundo, examino la estructura del mundo de la vida como un camino o vía hacia el campo de la experiencia trascendental—aquel de la correlación entre la vida humana (encarnada, intersubjetiva e histórico-temoral) y el mundo, es decir, la estructura noético-noemática, con el objeto de mostrar cómo no es reductible a una auto-afección pasiva, sino que es la fuente originaria de una virtud espiritual y capacidad transformativa: la de la responsabilidad. (shrink)

Feminism was born in controversy and it continues to flourish in controversy. The distinguished contributors to this volume provide an array of perspectives on issues including: universal values, justice and care, a feminist philosophy of science, and the relationship of biology to social theory.

The present publication forms part of a projected book that F. P. Ramsey drafted but never completed. It survived among his papers and ultimately came into the possession of the University of Pittsburgh in the circumstances detailed in the Editor's Introduction. Our hope in issuing this work at this stage - some sixty years after Ramsey's premature death at the age of 26 - is both to provide yet another token of his amazing philosophical creativity, and also to (...) make available an important datum for the still to be written history of the development of philosophical analysis. This is a book whose appearance will, we hope and expect, be appreciated both by those interested in linguistic philosophy itself and by those concerned for its historical development in the present century. EDITORS'INTRODUCTION 1. THE RAMSEY COLLECTION Frank Plump ton Ramsey was an extra ordinary scholarly phenomenon. Son of a distinguished mathematician and President of Magdalene College, Cambridge and brother of Arthur Michael, eventual Archbishop of Canterbury, Ramsey was closely connected with Cambridge throughout his life, ultimately becoming lecturer in Mathematics in the University. Notwithstanding his great mathematical talent, it was primarily logic and philosophy that engaged his interests, and he wrote original and important contributions to logic, semantics, epistomology, probability theory, philosophy of science, and economics, in addition to seminal work in the foundations of mathematics. (shrink)

Pure time preference is a preference for something to come at one point in time rather than another merely because of when it occurs in time. In opposition to Sidgwick, Ramsey, Rawls, and Parfit we argue that it is not always irrational to be guided by pure time preferences. We argue that even if the mere difference of location in time is not a rational ground for a preference, time may nevertheless be a normatively neutral ground for a preference, (...) and this makes it plausible to claim that the preference is rationally permitted. (shrink)

The paper deals mainly with two problems in the epistemology of Frank Plumpton Ramsey. One concerns his account of knowledge, the other his fallibilism. I argue that Ramsey failed to make room for the social aspect of knowledge and, furthermore, that he did not separate the fallibility of our view from its corrigibility. My positive proposal is to combine social reliabilism and corrigibilism with a rejection of fallibilism.

Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1903-1930), Cambridge mathematician and philosopher, was one of the most brilliant people of his generation. He lived in an extraordinarily stimulating milieu, surrounded by figures such as Russell, Whitehead, Keynes, Moore, and Wittgenstein. Ramsey's highly original papers on the foundations of mathematics, probability, economics, philosophy of science and the theory of knowledge were very influential in the 20th century and are still widely discussed in the 21st.

Frank Ramsey was the greatest of the remarkable generation of Cambridge philosophers and logicians which included G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Maynard Keynes. Before his tragically early death in 1930 at the age of twenty-six, he had done seminal work in mathematics and economics as well as in logic and philosophy. This volume, with a new and extensive introduction by D. H. Mellor, contains all Ramsey's previously published writings on philosophy and the foundations of mathematics. (...) The latter gives the definitive form and defence of the reduction of mathematics to logic undertaken in Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica; the former includes the most profound and original studies of universals, truth, meaning, probability, knowledge, law and causation, all of which are still constantly referred to, and still essential reading for all serious students of these subjects. (shrink)

F. P. Ramsey was a remarkably creative and subtle philosopher who in the briefest of academic careers made significant contributions to logic, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of language and decision theory. His few published papers reveal him to be a figure or comparable importance to Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein in the history of analytical philosophy. This book was the first critical study of Ramsey's work, offering a thorough exposition and interpretation of his ideas, setting the ideas in their (...) historical context, and assessing their significance for contemporary research. The study is intended to complement the reissue of Ramsey's papers edited by Professor Hugh Mellor. (shrink)

Frank Plumpton Ramsey, Cambridge mathematician and philosopher, was one of the most brilliant people of his generation. He lived in an extraordinarily stimulating milieu, surrounded by figures such as Russell, Whitehead, Keynes, Moore, and Wittgenstein. Ramsey's highly original papers on the foundations of mathematics, probability, economics, philosophy of science and the theory of knowledge were very influential in the 20th century and are still widely discussed in the 21st. Perhaps two of Ramsey's achievements outshine all the rest. (...) One is his treatment of the theoretical terms of scientific theories and the other is his deflationary account of truth. In 'Theories' he showed that, for any theory, it is always possible to offer an empirically equivalent one that does not contain theoretical terms by re-expressing it in what later became known as 'Ramsey sentences'. His account of truth was rediscovered in the 1960s and is now known as the 'prosentential' theory of truth. This collection of eleven new papers, specially written to commemorate his centenary, answers a crying need for more secondary literature on Frank Ramsey. Nearly all the aspects of Ramsey's work are examined: his logic, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, metaphysics, epistemology, pragmatism, economics, and the mutual influences between Ramsey and Wittgenstein. The book will be eagerly welcomed by those working in many branches of analytic philosophy and beyond. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:66. ' HUME ON SPACE AND GEOMETRY * : A REJOINDER TO FLEW ' S 'ONE RESERVATION '.? Flew' s reservation about my assertion that the Enquiry contains no significant revision of the Treatise conception of geometry as a body of necessary and synthetic knowledge, appears to involve two charges. Firstly, he alleges that I dismiss but offer no substantial argument against his own view that the Enquiry restores (...) pure geometry "to its place alongside the other two elements of the trinity ". Secondly, he thinks that I have committed a serious sin of omission in failing to take into consideration a certain passage in the Enquiry (page 31, section 27) which, in his opinion, constitutes "a quite decisive reason" for supposing that Hume abandoned the Treatise position, in that it contains an account of applied mathematics, a subject on which the Treatise is silent. To the charge of omission I plead guilty, and I shall presently seek to remedy this defect and to state why I do not share Flew' s view of the significance of the said passage. To the former charge I am not so ready to plead guilty, and I shall counter-charge that Flew has failed not only to do justice to my proposed reading of Enquiry page 25, section 20, but also to provide clear and convincing support for his own. One difficulty encountered in answering Flew lies in understanding whether or not his claim about the status of geometry as a pure science in the Enquiry is put forward independently of his interpretation of E31. As originally presented in Hume's Philosophy of Belief this appears to be the case, and if so, on what evidence does it rest? 2 In his book, Flew' s statement about Hume replacing pure geometry alongside arithmetic and algebra follows directly upon a paragraph in which he comments that Hume's references to geometrical propositions at E25 signify "an important advance from the position of the Treatise". For whereas the status of perfect precision and certainty was 67. there withheld from geometry (T71), Hume now speaks of the certainty and evidence of the propositions of Euclidean geometry, and declares such propositions to be discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. (E25) Now, I argued at some length in my paper (pp. 21-24) that Hume is prepared to grant scientific status to geometry in the Enquiry because he has come to regard its certainty as that proper to a mathematics of space. He has abandoned the Treatise contrast between an ideal or theoretical standard of equality, viewed therein as necessary to geometry considered as a science proper, and the merely sensible standard of equality upon which geometry as practised depends. It should not be forgotten that Hume recognises two kinds of certainty where "Relations of Ideas" are concerned, intuitive and demonstrative. Since he fails to provide any detail of the place of each of these in mathematics, the door is left open for speculation along the lines followed in pp. 28-29 of my paper. For there is nothing in?25 which implies that the certainty of all geometrical propositions is of the same kind, or that the process of geometrical demonstration is of the same logical nature as demonstrative reasoning in arithmetic and algebra. In his comment on my position Flew makes no reference to my proposed reason why Hume classes geometry as a science in the Enquiry.· Yet, even if this reclassification does mark an advance of a kind, the fact remains that E25 does not furnish incontrovertible evidence for that advance which Flew thinks he finds there. Nor, therefore, is it conclusive against my assertion that Hume in both works regards the propositions of geometry as necessary and synthetic truths. Given that Flew does not wish to deny the inclusion of a synthetic element even in the Enquiry account of mathematics (see H. P. B. pp. 64-66), I find it difficult to see why he supposes that the logical status of the propositions of geometry is different in the Enquiry from that in the Treatise, since in the latter too they are held 68. to be truths which depend... (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Foundations of mathematics Belief and truth Reasonable belief, probability, and knowledge Laws, causality, and theories Notes Bibliography.

We report the identification of a recurrent, 520-kb 16p12.1 microdeletion associated with childhood developmental delay. The microdeletion was detected in 20 of 11,873 cases compared with 2 of 8,540 controls and replicated in a second series of 22 of 9,254 cases compared with 6 of 6,299 controls. Most deletions were inherited, with carrier parents likely to manifest neuropsychiatric phenotypes compared to non-carrier parents. Probands were more likely to carry an additional large copy-number variant when compared to matched controls. The clinical (...) features of individuals with two mutations were distinct from and/or more severe than those of individuals carrying only the co-occurring mutation. Our data support a two-hit model in which the 16p12.1 microdeletion both predisposes to neuropsychiatric phenotypes as a single event and exacerbates neurodevelopmental phenotypes in association with other large deletions or duplications. Analysis of other microdeletions with variable expressivity indicates that this two-hit model might be more generally applicable to neuropsychiatric disease. © 2010 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)